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ABSTRACT. Beckett, as a typical modern author, adopts a position between subjectivity and 
objectivity, and in the gap between these two, by focusing on the latter on one hand, represents an 
image of Lukacs's realistic view and on the other hand, by scrutinizing more precisely, offers a 
profile of the existentialist view. Beckett's presence itself in this gap inevitably entails a critical 
representation of both realms. His characters, in confrontation with modern subjectivization, seek 
refuge to the fragmented reified objectivity leading to desubjectivization, which is in line with 
Beckett's characters' anxiety and angst of thinking about their existential how-ness. Meanwhile, 
their denying the past is synonymous with negating Dasein's temporality features, and this ends in 
the dissolution of their most primary existential feature, projection. The concomitance of these 
features eventuates in the appearance of characters such as Vladimir and Estragon who evade 
thinking like a modern subject, that is, a kind of thinking which revolves around a transcendental 
signified.   
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Does the application of the word, "absurd" to Beckett's works refer only to the contents of 
the dialogue or all the other things pertaining to contents? Or does this word show itself in the form 
of the works rather than in the contents? In Beckett's works, the external form including scenery, 
language used in the dialogues, the references of the dialogues, clothing and the actors' act, 
consciously involve manifold paradoxes which imply the claim of meaninglessness. This 
meaninglessness has its roots in the immediate perception of the world; a world which is composed 
of ambiguous events and acts, the reasons for which are left concealed to all. Thus, the form of the 
work encompasses elements which at first sight and later considerations, are not connected by any 
single logic; evading a structured bond among the elements of the work is in fact evading all the 
traditional forms; forms which attempt to offer a plausible and cogent logic for the events of the 
world by claiming to represent a realistic reflection of the reality. In this view, forms in Beckett's 
works still adhere to offer a realistic representation, and to put it more precisely, the form of 
Beckett's works are the most realistic forms to reflect the events of the modern world; a world 
replete with fragmented and disintegrated events far away from humans' logic of causality. To offer 
and represent itself precisely, a world, which cannot be incorporated in the formal system of signs, 
requires a form whose fragmentation is born out of the contents of that world. Thus, it is not just the 
form which reflects the contents of the world, but the realities of the world themselves produce such 
a fragmented form. To put it more precisely, one fragment of the contents of the world necessitate a 
specific form, and another fragment of its contents negates this specific form to induce the genesis 
of another form and out of this dialectic of negation of negation ( negative dialectic)(Adorno 11-
22), Beckettesque form emerges. Therefore, the formal fragments of the work are the sedimentation 
of all the fragmented elements of the world's meaning or in Adorno's phrasing, the "form has truth-
contents"(Jarvis 25-80) .  
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2. FRAGMENTED UNITY 
      As we said before, events are essentially meaningless, therefore, any image of an aesthetic 
essential idea which can show the unity of the intention and its representation, turns out to be an 
illusion. The word, "meaning":  
Covers the metaphysical content that is represented objectively in the          
complexion of the artifact; the intention of the whole as a complex of meaning that is 
the inherent meaning of the drama; and finally the meaning of the words and 
sentences spoken by the characters and their meaning in sequence, the dialogic 
meaning. But these equivocations point to something shared. In Beckett's … that 
common ground becomes a continuum. Historically, this continuum is supported by 
a change in the a priori of drama: the fact that there is no longer any substantive, 
affirmative metaphysical meaning that could provide dramatic form with its law and 
its epiphany. That, however, disrupts the dramatic form down to its linguistic 
infrastructure. Drama cannot simply take negative meaning, or the absence of 
meaning, as its content without everything peculiar to it being affected to the point of 
turning into its opposite. The essence of drama was constituted by that 
meaning."(Adorno 275-299) 
Adorno distinguishes between two kinds of meanings. When we, as a rationalizing being, 
stick to our totalizing reason and try to grasp the whole meaning of the text, we get involved in the 
inherent meaning, but, when we focus our attention on some isolated contexts of the text, and 
attempt to realize the logic of the coincidence of the words and the sentences, plus their subsequent 
connotative and denotative meanings, we are engaged in unearthing the dialogic meaning. 
However, there should be something common between these two which unite them, while 
pervading through the work. In contrast to the previous self-evident presumptions of the dramatic 
coherence, this evasive unity never succumbs to any affirmative metaphysical meaning which ends 
in regulated and organized form and it shows itself in the fragments of language, disintegrating 
form into the least linguistic bits. 
Were drama to try to survive meaning aesthetically, it would become inadequate to 
its substance and be degraded to a clattering machinery for the demonstration of 
world views, as if often the case with existentialist plays. The explosion of the 
metaphysical meaning, which was the only thing guaranteeing the unity of the 
aesthetic structure, causes the latter to crumble with a necessity and stringency in no 
way unequal to that of the traditional canon of dramatic form. Unequivocal aesthetic 
meaning and its subjectivization in concrete, tangible intention was a surrogate for 
the transcendent meaningfulness whose very denial constitutes aesthetic content 
".."(Adorno 299) 
 
From this view, the fixed, integrate and well-composed form of the existentialist works 
which is a cliché, has an ideological characteristic leading to nothing but confirmation of the status 
quo. One cliché after another, facing the content-less world which is represented by these works, is 
a ridiculous paradox which is a far distance from realism. One the other front, the socialist realism 
which claims to understand the objective and with an eighteenth century optimism believes that an 
objective and exact historical representation of the bourgeois evolving forces for creating revolution 
is possible, finally is trapped within a rational and coherent narrative of reality(Good 1-12). We 
should notice that any rational and coherent form means that the status quo of the world is a rational 
situation, while catastrophe signifies a confusing cul-de-sac of rationality and also it is a 
consequence of the absence of human rationality. In the absence of reason, how can we present a 
rational narration of the catastrophe? Thus, any kind of the (formal) rational narrative seeks to give 
a rational image of an irrational world, as if the reader hasn’t lived the catastrophe before and after 
reading the work; the elimination of the catastrophe from the narrative implies that we are leading a 
salubrious life, thereby confirming the status quo.  
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3. THE SILENCE OF THE LANGUAGE 
 Confronting the catastrophe, reason is left frustrated, the reason which tends to 
conceptualize and categorize; the reason which levels the particular and the individual in the shape 
of homogenizing totalities and therefore, sacrifices the possibility of concrete comprehension of the 
particular for the sake of the total categories; the reason which optimistically introduces the process 
of categorizing from the world of objects into the world of human beings and classifies people into 
orderly, inviolable ranks(Adorno and Horkheimer 38-45). Now, this reason cannot incorporate the 
present catastrophe into any of its categories. The catastrophe is an object which cannot be 
integrated in any abstraction of the narcissistic reason. Reason cannot present a coherent and 
rational narrative of the catastrophe. Consequently, language, which used to reveal the categories of 
the reason devoutly, and provided reason with the seemingly sufficient (and suspicious) possibility 
of presenting a rational narrative, kneels down in front of the catastrophe, due to the incompetency 
of reason.  
As Adorno and Horkheimer point out in "the dialectic of enlightenment", before the 
formation of the enlightenment reason, the dread of the human beings was represented in the form 
of onomatopoeia, which is in fact mimesis of the real things and had its roots in the objective 
experience of human beings(12-65). At this point, with the decadence of the enlightenment reason, 
it is as if human beings are facing a similar situation, as if human beings are thrown into pre or post-
enlightenment situation. So we cannot expect the utterances to represent the reality as they did 
faithfully before the catastrophe. Concepts shrink from their references, words won't be reference-
oriented, and signifiers will be alienated from their signifieds. So floods of fragmented sentences, 
words devoid of references, illogical repartees and repeated ironies, etc are representative of the 
failure of language (as a result of the failure of reason). Language in Beckett's works approximate 
silence. This silence of language, reveals a specific from of concision in Beckett's works, he never 
refers to the atomic "catastrophe" in his work, "endgame". If he gives an account of the event like 
the so-called realistic works, he is trapped in a rational narrative and if he just mentions the 
catastrophe, as in well-consumed minimalistic works, he confirms the rational correspondence 
between the signifier and the signified, the concept and the reference. Beckett washes his hands off 
these two and shows the silence of language in a concision evading meaning. This process of the 
silence of language, goes so far as it, in Becektt's works such as "All that Fall" "Waiting for Godot", 
questions the communication through language itself. Can we really find a reference for the 
meaningless word, "Godot"? Are the context-less dialogues of "All that fall", looking for the 
communication as their final end? Why does Beckett in his, "Act without Words II ", shows all 
what he says in three simple graphic pictures? Don’t all these represent the silence (failure) of 
language in Beckett's works?. 
*** 
It can be said that the failure of language is a result of the reification of language. When 
human relationships have been radically reifies in the late capitalism, relations, phenomena, objects, 
all and all, own their meaning to the concept of reification, that is, ideas, words and concepts find 
their meaning in reification. To put it more clearly, since language is considered to be a reflection of 
reality, the reified reality creates commodified concepts and ideas through the medium of language. 
From this perspective, the certainty and validity of the object is more than those of subjective 
concepts, so the subject seeks recourse to the objects even for proving and understanding his own 
existence. The language which used to be regarded as a self-enclosed system, although it still 
depends on its own differential and relational characteristics, now gets its functions of conveying 
meaning from objects in a unilateral relationship. From this perspective, this failure is characteristic 
of Beckett's works which disclose the psychological situation of his characters in the context of 
irony. Throughout "All that Fall ", the characters have no choice but seeking recourse to the objects 
in order to represent their own psychological condition. For example, Mrs,Rooni who is obsessed 
with her infertility and barrenness, likens herself to a mole. And in another example, she likens 
herself to a sack which shows the death of all of her natural emotions and the reification of her 
body.  
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With one glimpse, Beckett's characters are similar to the objects not only in their simile 
grounds, but also in regard with their self- understanding. They are fragmented as the objects 
surrounding them. In the commodified world, the objectivity of the commodity is more valid and 
reliable and meaningful. When the individual labor force finds its most valuable determination in 
the commodity, when the laborer must live to just produce the commodity, so to define himself, to 
utter his psyche, what other way does he have but seeking recourse to the object? Unlike the 
Cartesian subject, who insists on his existence amid the division between him and the object, 
Beckettean characters are thrown into isolated objects. These subjects own their existence to their 
similarity to the object.  
The subjects of Beckett's characters, are afflicted with reification on the one hand, and are 
entangled in seeking to understand themselves on the other hand, that is, they are wandering in the 
conflict between self-estrangement (the negation of identity) and the formation of the identity. And 
unlike Adorno's Odyssey, their self-negation (the death of the self ) doesn’t signify the formation of 
their rational subject. In other words, to sacrifice the self for the sacred is the beginning of the 
formation of the identity. In the next step, sacrifice is internalized, and this self-sacrifice leads to the 
formation of the rational subject of Odyssey (Adorno and Horkheimer85-120), (something like 
Freudian civilization which directs the Libido and leads to the formation of the superego (Freud 12-
85)). If Adorno thinks that Oddysey, equates the fear of regression into Nature with the dissolution 
of the self, these Beckettean characters steep themselves in the reified objectivity of the world 
blissfully. All Winie's life in "Happy Days", is dependent on lipstick, gun, umbrella, bag, and 
newspaper in her hand. If these things didn’t exist, what would she be? 
Another aspect of Beckett's characters' relationship with objects is their obsession with 
objects. It is as if Vladimir is always involved in checking his own hat, Estragon is preoccupied 
with his shoes, Lucky is concerned with carrying the bag and so on. These mental obsessions with 
habitual behaviors of Beckett's characters, in Beckett's words, are a way out of their existential 
suffering (along with their memories)(Alvarez121-167). Emancipation for a moment, brought about 
by these habitual relations with objects, divulges the memory of the dissolution of the rational 
subject. The obsession of Beckett's characters on the other hand, covers their fundamental tension; 
if they stop their preoccupation with objects, and their verbosity, that tension will surge up. That 
fundamental tension is the assignment of thinking about existence. The assignment of conceiving 
themselves as an integrate existence in a fragmented world. Fear of thinking, anxiety of reflection, 
is the axis of their personality. If I think, therefore I am, but I don’t consider this kind of being as 
belonging to me. So unlike the Sartrean subject, I have no existential angst, but I have the anxiety of 
thinking, since just after thinking, I will exist and then I should accept the responsibility of what I 
am.  If Vladimir and Estragon enjoy waiting, this is because waiting means not doing anything, 
therefore, Vladimir would like the sun to set, till they can leave with a happy conscience. The 
obsession of these two characters is a way to reduce the tension, aren’t they anxious about Godot's 
coming more than his not coming? If Godot comes, everything will be all right, the transcendental 
signified( Godot) gives meaning to everything, words find their own references again, the signifiers 
rely on the signifieds , the subject starts his  abstract process of subjectivization, the particular 
submits to the authority of the universal and thinking begins, and the anxiety of thinking  prevails. 
So it will be better if Godot does not come, so that the subject does not get engaged in this 
fundamental tension (thinking being equal to Godot's coming).  
 
4. TIME AS A POINT DE CAPTION 
The interesting point about beckett's character is that despite the fragmentation of their lives, 
a particular temporal point concentrates all their acts on itself, Vladimir waits for the sunset, Ham 
expects to take his pills and so on. For one thing, it can be said these points are the last faintest 
traces of modern organized world, the last sign in which we should seek the truth in Adorno's 
phrasing in the actuality of philosophy(15-28). The time which gives a temporal narrative of the 
subject in the daily of human beings, the time, the reference to which constructs the illusion of 
identity integrity, here, is merely a point of deferring the understanding of the present desperation. 
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In fact, avoiding thinking about what happens to us at the time being, casts us to a seemingly 
meaningful future. This future is more meaningless than the present, since Beckett's characters who 
are subjectivizing themselves, not only consider every determinate and exact moment as having no 
meaning, but also deem the process of reference (in any utterance) intentionally unintended, thereby 
presenting a paradoxical parody out of organized a modern man.  
From this perspective, Beckett's characters in their being there ( Da-sein) and their 
projection into a moment in the future, have the most un-ontological approach. Thus, what we said 
about the dissolution of these characters in the fragmented reified objectivity can be interpreted in 
an ontological perspective as having inclination toward ontic understanding(Babak Ahmadi 29-
117). To put it more exactly, Beckett's characters are the least dense form of Dasein. The 
relationship between Beckett's characters and temporality involves some ontological points about 
them. Dasein is itself a temporality(Heidegger 12- 82). In Heidggar's view, Dasein, primordial 
temporality has three kinds of ecstasy, including ecstasy of present perfect, of present simple, and of 
future. Among these three, the ecstasy of future, is the most important one and has the closest 
affinity with projection. In understanding the primordial temporality, the point to be reflected on is 
that the primordial temporality is not identical with the daily clock-time. On the contrary all the 
clock time (daily) hours can only be primarily based on this primordial temporality. Furthermore, 
the way temporality times itself, must be considered as "has been presenting future"(Gorner 35-69)  
. in this timing as Heideggar says, there is no chronological order among those three ecstasies, that 
is, future is not later than "has been" and is not sooner than the present(.  From this discussion we 
can conclude that: first, ( as we said before), the projection of Beckett's characters to a temporal 
point in the future which is absurd and meaningless, ruins the most crucial existential characteristic, 
that is, projection. Besides, Dasein's temporality, from Heideggar's view, is not specially directed to 
the present; neither is it trapped in the past events, nor specifically oriented towards an action in the 
future. The question which arises here is that what the relationship between Beckett's characters and 
this temporality is. To put it in a more tangible way, this question can take the following forms: 
why does Estragon repeatedly deny his past consciously?   Why does Krap conjure up his past in 
the tape? and so on. By focusing on temporality, Estragon's situation is particularly meaningful. In 
contrast to Alvarez's belief that Estragon is suffering from amnesia(112), Estragon is definitely 
aware of his past, but he consciously pretends to be unaware. The fact that a person can remember 
his yesterday, the day before yesterday, and two days before yesterday, and so on, in a coherent 
temporal sequence, is synonymous with the fact that he gives a temporal narrative of himself and in 
each of his acts, he is flowing in time ontologically and his being there is the same as his 
temporality. But Estragon not only has no such an ontological understanding of his temporality, but 
also he doesn’t accept even the clock time. He ,through a process of desubjectivization, by driving 
the past from his memory, exempts himself from thinking about his frequent experiences. From this 
perspective, he is taking two simultaneous actions, in two different philosophical levels; in one 
level, avoiding the human existence, resulted from avoidance of temporality, and in the other level, 
moving in the direction of desubjectivaztion( influenced by anxiety of thinking in contrast to 
Sartrean anxiety of being) and also in the direction of  anxiety caused by the dissolution of the self 
in fragmented reified objectivity( in contrast to the Odyssean self-development)( Adorno and 
Horkheimer91-105). When these points aligned with his obsessive behavior ( with Vladimir ) are 
considered as a way to escape from their fundamental tension, specifically their anxiety for Godot's 
coming ( in a way that they would like Godot not to come, since his coming means the resurgence 
of the transcendental signified, that is, the beginning of meaning, the correspondence between the 
signifier and the signified, abstraction and the beginning of thinking) which signifies their anxiety 
of thinking.  
It can be said the process of desubjectivization concealed in Estragon is the origin of the 
cynical postmodern subject. Estragon is the prototype of the postmodern intellectual; the intellectual 
who is afraid of thinking like a modern subject. The experience of the modern subject revolves 
around the transcendental signifier, (reason, human, money, surplus value..), but now  Godot who is 
parodically and paradoxically suggestive of the word "God" ( the transcendental signifier of all 
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ages), even while  being converted into the transcendental signifier, is  parodied again. Estragon is 
waiting for a Godot who is nothing, and whose existence does not carry such significance as that of 
his shoes. Estragon is a subject who is anxious of thinking like a modern subject, whose thinking 
orbits around the transcendental signified ( and signifier) and to conceal this anxiety, he exorcises 
all  things in the past, present and future from his memory, all that which leads him to Godot and 
instead, gets attached to his daily obessions.   
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this essay we tried to introduce Beckett as a typical modern writer who takes a stance 
between subjectivity and objectivity; and in the gulf between these two, firstly, he focuses on the 
latter and depicts an image of Lukacs's realistic standpoint and secondly he delves further into the 
modern reified conditions and presents a profile of the existentialist view. Amidst this gap, 
Beckett's existence itself ineluctably involves a critical depiction of both areas. His characters, in 
facing modern subjectivization, find their niche in the fragmented reified objectivity ending in 
desubjectivization, which coincides with Beckett's characters' anxiety of thinking about their own 
existential conditions and subsequently their angst of thinking itself. In the meantime their negation 
of the past is in line with negating Dasein's temporality characteristics, and this gives rise to the 
dissolution of their most essential existential feature, projection. The concomitance of these features 
culminates in the emergence of characters such as Vladimir and Estragon who evade thinking like a 
modern subject, that is, a kind of thinking which is based on a transcendental signified (and 
signifier). In this respect, they happen to be the harbingers of postmodern thinkers.   
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